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Abstract
A recent wave of academic and popular publications say that utopia is
within reach: Automation will progress to such an extent and include
Katharina Nieswandt “Automation, Basic Income and Merit”
so many high-skill tasks that much human work will soon become
superfluous. The gains from this highly automated economy, authors
suggest, could be used to fund a universal basic income (UBI). Today’s
employees would live off the robots’ products and spend their days on
intrinsically valuable pursuits.
I argue that this prediction is unlikely to come true. Historical prece-
dent speaks against it, but the main problem is that the prediction fun-
damentally misunderstands how capitalism works—its incentives to
increase or decrease production, its principles of income allocation,
and the underlying conception of merit.
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Part I
AWorld without Work?
1 The UBI-After-Work Argument
The following argument is popular in current literature on artificial
intelligence (AI) and the future of work:
P1 Automation will progress to such an extent that most hu-
man work will become superfluous.
P2 Superfluous workers should be supported.
C Some of the gains from the highly automated economy should
be used to fund a universal basic income (UBI).
Call this the “UBI-after-work argument.” It frequently appears in news-
paper headlines and tech blogs, but also in academic writings (for ex-
ample, Bruun and Duka, 2018; Ford, 2015; Mann, 2018; Srnicek and
Williams, 2016). Recently, the fear of automation has prompted policy
documents (for example, European Parliament, 2017; Executive Office
of the President, 2016).
My paper evaluates the UBI-after-work argument. I shall reject P1
(sections 5–8) and thereby P2, which simply expresses a consequence
of P1; that is, I argue that the argument is not sound. My objection to
P1 says that, within a competitive market, automation provides an in-
centive to expand production rather than an incentive to lay off work-
ers, and indeed that has been the result of previous waves of automa-
tion (such as the spread of engines or of computers). As a last step, I
analyze a central presupposition of the UBI-after-work argument (sec-
tion 9): that income in contemporary economies is merited. Contrary
to what its proponents claim, this argument hence does not advocate
substantial economic change. The highly-automated production facil-
ities would continue to be privately owned; all we would do is to abol-
ish the means-test for welfare recipients.
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Please note that my chapter only evaluates the UBI-after-work ar-
gument, not UBI more generally. While I reject the argument, this does
not exclude that there are other, sound arguments for UBI. To follow
my discussion, an understanding of “UBI” (section 2) and some famil-
iarity with the empirical findings on UBI (sections 3–4) are helpful. If
you already possess both, please proceed to section 5.
2 What Is “UBI”?
We can define UBI as follows:
UBI = a payment that is unconditional & sufficient & regular.
The three adjectives, “unconditional,” “sufficient” and “regular” cap-
ture the three definitional features.
1. If the payment is based on a preceding evaluation of the recipi-
ent’s needs, then it is not “universal.” A universal basic income is
paid to absolutely everybody (BIEN, 2019).
2. If the payment is not sufficient to cover the recipient’s basic needs,
then it is not a basic income but a top-up of an income from an-
other source, such as employment income or pensions, capital
gains, alimony, welfare payments or the like. (Confusingly, some
authors call such a top-up a “partial basic income” and oppose
this to a “full basic income,” see BIEN, 2019). There is disagree-
ment about what basic needs are. It could be mere survival, or
a certain minimal quality of life—examples would be defenses
of UBI from basic human needs, such as Murray’s (2008). We
could also take the ability to preserve what characterizes you as
a person as our measure (Radin, 1993a,b) or basic capabilities
(Nussbaum, 2006) or some type of equality or of freedom (Parijs,
1995)—to name just a few options. Whatever we regard as basic,
however, has to be covered by this income.
Postprint | August 6, 2020 Page 4 of 28
Katharina Nieswandt “Automation, Basic Income and Merit”
3. If the payment is not regular, then it is, by definition, not an in-
come. There are alternative proposals, such as that of a universal
basic capital, which is a lump sum paid to everyone upon reach-
ing adulthood (often traced back to Thomas Paine, made popu-
lar by Ackerman and Alstott (1999) and more recently defended
by Anderson (2017)).
3 UBI Still Untested
What would a society with UBI be like? You might be surprised to
hear that we don’t know. Very few of the many past and current ba-
sic income experiments have implemented all three definitional fea-
tures. The vast majority violate feature 1 and many additionally vio-
late feature 2. Payments are usually made only to the poorest and of-
ten in insufficient amounts, even if we define “sufficient” as ’enabling
bare survival’. Italy’s “citizen’s income” (Giuffrida, 2019), the “basic
income” of the Canadian province of Ontario (Government of On-
tario, 2017) and Finland’s “basic income” (Henley, 2018) all required
a means test. Italy’s payments also imposed further conditions that
standardly come with welfare payments, such as a requirement to en-
roll in job training. Finland’s experiment was the only one that did
not halt payments if participants obtained additional employment.
The Finnish payments, however, were below the poverty line. A re-
cent experiment in rural India finally implemented all three features
and even included payments to children (Standing, 2013). The results
were encouraging, but they are probably not informative for the main
question regarding UBI: Would UBI be better than the social security
systems already in place in more affluent countries? (The researchers
paid USD 7.5 per month, which is the poverty line for rural India, to
people who had had no public security net before.)
Why are there so few proper implementations? The main reasons
are a lack of funding and of sustained political support (Winick, 2018).
In addition, the operationalization of UBI’s three definitional features
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poses certain principled difficulties, such as an artificially limited time
horizon. Participants of an experiment know that their income is tem-
porary; often they even know when exactly it will stop. Similarly, cit-
izens of a government that implements UBI know that this policy can
be abolished again with a change of government. Such knowledge
probably influences behavior—few participants would quit their job,
for example, for a time-limited UBI.
4 Would UBI Bring Utopia or Dystopia?
Since UBI remains to be properly tested, predictions about what a so-
ciety with UBI would be like are speculative. They extrapolate, either
from incomplete implementations or from more general findings in
behavioral economics. As a result, these predictions vary widely.
The context of automation introduces a further unknown variable,
given that the respective technologies themselves are merely predicted:
We cannot oberve their effects on a real society, and often we don’t
even know whether they will in fact be developed. There are at least
four regularly proposed scenarios for automation combined with UBI:
Utopia: Leisure for everyone.
If we introduced UBI today, people would begin to spend
more of their time on intrinsically valuable or on socially
necessary pursuits (such as raising children). Once automa-
tion spreads extensively, this process will culminate in Fully
Automated Luxury Communism (Bastani, 2017), a world in
which all production facilities are publicly owned and staffed
only with robots, so that all products are available to all
without work.
Dystopia 1: A class of the superfluous.
Since automation does nothing to change the ownership of
the production facilities, the robots will still be privately
owned and so will be the products they make (Dinerstein
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and Pitts, 2018). People whose jobs have been automated
will form a tech lumpenproletariat, surviving on UBI as scraps
from the table, paid for by their former employers as well as
those fellow citizens who still work.
Dystopia 2: A world of alcoholics.
This scenario comes in two versions. The first is a conse-
quence of Dystopia 1, the second of Utopia. The first version
says that the poverty and endless amount of freetime result-
ing from massive technological unemployment will lead to
an erosion of society in the long run. The class of UBI depen-
dents will develop the same ails as the unemployed in dein-
dustrialized regions today; they will be poor, unhealthy, so-
cially isolated and angry. The second version says that the
material abundance and endless amount of freetime result-
ing from fully automated luxury communism will cause “a
nervous breakdown of the sort which is already common
enough in England and the United States amongst the wives
of the well-to-do classes, unfortunate women, many of them,
who have been deprived by their wealth of their traditional
tasks and occupations” (Keynes (2010, p. 327), echoing Woll-
stonecraft (1989, chapter 4) as well as numerous derisive
comments on the degraded character of non-working class
women and the nobility that Adam Smith makes across his
works).
Dystopia 3: Economic breakdown.
Experiments in behavioral economics regularly demonstrate
that the majority of human beings is not altruistic enough
for UBI. Too many would stop working once they received
UBI. Until we actually reach a level of automation that ren-
ders most human work superfluous, we hence cannot fund
UBI (Enste, 2019).
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Part II
Does Technology Eliminate Jobs?
5 Forget Experiments, Consider Mechanisms
Given how difficult it is to test the empirical hypotheses involved in
the discussion of automation and UBI and how speculative, as a re-
sult, any prediction is that we base on such tests, I suggest a different
strategy. Rather than analyze the insufficient data, I want to step back
and consider some underlying economic mechanisms.
To evaluate the UBI-after-work argument, we must answer the fol-
lowing question: Is an increase in automation likely to cause a significant
and permanent decrease in the overall number of jobs or work hours and,
thus, likely to create the need for UBI (or another political response)?
My answer will be that (i) historical evidence speaks against the
prediction of permanent technological unemployment (section 6), as
(ii) do certain mechanisms of competitive markets (section 7). In the
past, technological progress in production resulted in new occupa-
tions and more products, whereas more leisure was the result of po-
litical decisions. If you consider how markets function, you immedi-
ately see why. It is hence unlikely that there will ever be a technology-
induced need for UBI. In the future, UBI will likely be as necessary or
as unnecessary as it is today.
6 Past Predictions and Past Outcomes
Let’s begin by looking at historical precedents. There regularly are pre-
dictions that machines will make human labor redundant, some of
which offer concrete lists of tasks or even calculations of the hours to
be saved.
In 1891, for example, Oscar Wilde (“The Soul of Man under Social-
ism”) predicts that future machines would render wage-slavery su-
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perfluous:
All unintellectual labour, all monotonous, dull labour, all
labour that deals with dreadful things, and involves un-
pleasant conditions, must be done by machinery. Machin-
ery must work for us in coal mines, and do all sanitary ser-
vices, and be the stoker of steamers, and clean the streets,
and run messages on wet days, and do anything that is te-
dious or distressing. At present machinery competes against
man. Under proper conditions machinery will serve man.
There is no doubt at all that this is the future of machinery
[...]. The fact is, that civilisation requires slaves. [...] Human
slavery is wrong, insecure, and demoralising. On mechan-
ical slavery, on the slavery of the machine, the future of the
world depends. (2007, p. 1180)
In 1930, John Maynard Keynes (“Economic Possibilities for Our Grand-
children”) famously classifies the ongoing Great Depresssion as a tem-
porary bump in humanity’s road to “solving its economic problem” (2010,
p. 325, emphasis in original). Based on the better understanding of eco-
nomic growth and on empirical tools for measuring it, which recent
developments in economics afforded, he argues that:
There is evidence that the revolutionary technical changes,
which have so far chiefly affected industry, may soon be
attacking agriculture. We may be on the eve of improve-
ments in the efficiency of food production as great as those
which have already taken place in mining, manufacture,
and transport. In quite a few years—in our own lifetimes
I mean—we may be able to perform all the operations of
agriculture, mining, and manufacture with a quarter of the
human effort to which we have been accustomed. (p. 325)
Given this rate of productivity increase, by 2030, humanity’s biggest
problem would become “how to occupy the leisure” (p. 328). Indeed,
Keynes worries so much about this last point that he suggests we
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“make what work there is still to be done to be as widely shared as
possible” and thereby ease the transition (p. 329).
In 1980, André Gorz (Farewell to the Working Class) predicts similar
productivity increases for the rest of the 20th century. Additionally,
he worries about the elimination of “jobs by the million” during the
impending “micro-electronic revolution” (1982, p. 135). He suggests to
use these technological advances to progressively reduce workloads:
Imagine that society were to distribute yearly productivity
gains in the following way: a third in the form of greater
purchasing power and two thirds in the form of additional
free time. With an annual increase in productivity of five
per cent—easily achieved in the past—the length of the
working week would fall from 40 to 35 hours over a pe-
riod of four years. After four more years it would stand at
no more than 30.5 hours, and after a total of 12 years would
amount to 26 hours 40 minutes. A 20-hour week could be
achieved in 20 years, by the year 2001. (p. 135)
None of these Utopian predictions has come true. This is surprising,
given that the first half of each is largely correct: Many of the imag-
ined inventions were made, and productivity rose even more than pre-
dicted. As Figure 1 on page 11 (from Sprague, 2014, p. 3) illustrates, the
average contemporary US worker is five times as productive as their
grandparent.
Paradoxically, work hours did not decline during the same time.
Most employees today report to still work forty or more hours per
week, as Figure 2 on page 11 (from Saad, 2014) illustrates.
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Figure 1: Productivity increase since 1947
Figure 2: Work hours today
Calculated over a lifetime, work hours were even raised. As Figure 3
on page 12 (from Prins and Kalf, 2015, p. 4) illustrates, almost all Eu-
ropean countries have implemented reforms in recent years that aim
to raise the retirement age.
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Figure 3: Recent retirement age reforms
Some readers might object that this increase is simply proportional to
longer lifespans and lower birthrates. If a retirement scheme requires
that all participants work n per cent of their life-time, then n will mean
a longer number of years if people live longer, and similarly if the ratio
of contributing to receiving participants sinks. As the earlier Figure 1
illustrates, however, workers’ productivity multiplied by five. Hence
we should be able to live five times as long as our grandparents before
an additional hour of work becomes necessary, or we could have only
one fifth of the number of children that they had, or a mixture of both.
In sum, the technological advances of the last decades significantly
increased workers’ productivity but not their free-time. How can this
be? If I am five times as productive as my grandmother, then why can’t
I leave my desk after one-and-a-half hours of work each day rather
than eight hours? Or, alternatively, why can’t I retire after an eight-
year, eight-hour work-life rather than a forty-year, eight-hour work-
life? Why did neither the combustion engine nor the computer nor
the internet nor any other technological advance ever reduce average
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lifetime work hours?
Before we proceed to answering this question (section 7), there is
a problem with the above futuristic predictions that I want to flag
here, just to put it aside. The type of scenario that Keynes describes,
for example, seems to be this: If we had a time machine to transport
the technology available in 2012 back to production facilities in 1947,
then, as Figure 1 suggests, we could quintuple their output. Imag-
ine a shoe factory in 1947 suddenly being equipped with robot arms
that stitch pieces of leather together, with a sales department that re-
ceives orders through the internet and has them packed onto GPS-
assisted trucks, et cetera. It is questionable, however, whether the tech-
nologies involved—the personal computer, the internet, satellites et
cetera—would have been invented and would have spread to the ex-
tent reached in 2012, had we continuously reduced work hours to one
fifth since 1947. Keynes (2010, p. 325) argues that “[i]f capital increases,
say, two per cent per annum, [then] the capital equipment of the world
will have increased by a half in twenty years, and seven and a half
times in a hundred years.” This compounding, however, cannot hap-
pen if we progressively reduce the rate of capital increase and hence
reduce the amount that compounds. The problem that Keynes’ sce-
nario faces strikes me as similar to the “grandfather paradox” of time
travel: If you had a time machine and used it to travel back so as to
change a past event, then that event would never have happened;
hence you would never have travelled back to change it. Similarly, the
compounding effects of technological inventions have made us five
times as productive as we were in 1947, but this compounding would
not have occurred had we reduced work hours with each invention
since 1947 to always stay at the productivity level of 1947. I mention
this here just to flag that it is questionable whether the imagined sce-
nario is even coherent.
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7 Automation in a Competitive Market
Back now to our question as to why technology does not reduce work-
hours. The answer is that, in a competitive market—and by compet-
itive market, I mean a market that is open for all to enter and exit
and that is transparent—productivity increases usually result in more
products rather than in more free time or higher wages. This point is
already contained in various passages in Marx’s works, which Ger-
ald Cohen (2000, chapter 11) synthesizes. Cohen concludes: “The eco-
nomic form most able to relieve toil is least disposed to do so. [. . . ]
It brings society to the threshold of abundance and locks the door”
(pp. 306–7). As I shall argue, the only way to distribute productivity
increases in the form of more time rather than more products is to
legally force all market participants to do so.
Let’s take the example of a shoe factory again. In 2017, the US shoe
manufacturer Keen and the robotics company House of Design pre-
sented UneekBot: a robot that stitches a complete sneaker upper onto
a rubber sole from a spindle of yarn in only six minutes. This is “half
the time it would take a human,” even though the robot “still relies
on humans for the final touches” (Nikolov, 2017). Imagine you own
a shoe factory. You have 100 workers, in 8-hour shifts, each stitching
a new shoe every 12 minutes, that is, 20 pairs per worker per shift.
That’s 20 x 100 = 2,000 pairs per day. At a trade show, you come across
UneekBot and consider purchasing some of these robots. Let’s assume
that the “final touches” take a worker 6 minutes, so that during the
time in which 1 robot stitches 1 new shoe, 1 worker can carry out all
final touches on the previous shoe. In this scenario, a purchase could
halve production time. Here are three choices you could make:
Utopia: Purchase 100 robots, keep your 100 workers, halve the shift
to 4 hours while keeping the pay the same (once the robots
are paid off), and continue to produce 2,000 pairs per day.
Dystopia: Purchase 50 robots, halve the workforce to 50 workers, keep
the 8-hour shift, and continue to produce 2,000 pairs per
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day.
More Shoes: Purchase 100 robots, keep your 100 workers, keep the 8-
hour shift, and double your production to 4,000 pairs per
day.
Which do you choose? From your perspective as the owner, Dystopia
clearly wins over Utopia. You only need to pay half the number of
wages in comparison. So Utopia will not be realized if the choice is
yours. Which of the remaining scenarios would an owner prefer? Your
profit = (sales price - production cost) x number of pairs. The first two
variables are the same in both scenarios, but the third variable doubles
in More Shoes compared to Dystopia and hence so does your profit.
Therefore, an owner’s preferred choice is More Shoes. Dystopia, too, will
not be realized.
I am brushing over a number of details here that can lead to a dif-
ferent outcome. For instance, the shoe market could already be satu-
rated. If there aren’t enough buyers for 4,000 pairs per day, then you
will prefer Dystopia to More Shoes. Another important detail is that
there will be a difference between your short- and long-term posi-
tion in the market. In the above scenario, you are a pioneer: As one of
the first producers who install the new technology, you make twice as
many products as your competitors in the same time and hence earn
twice as much. Once your competitors start buying UneekBots, you
all produce twice as much in the same time, which usually means that
product prices are cut in half. Your doubled profit is hence temporary.
For our current question, we can put these details aside and fo-
cus on the underlying principle: In an open and transparent market,
where the means of production are privately owned—that is, in an ide-
alized capitalism—automation neither leads to Utopia nor to Dystopia.
It does not lead to Utopia because the owner of the means of pro-
duction has no egoistic incentive to give the workers paid time off.
It is important to see, however, that even an altruistic owner or a
worker-owned factory could not do this. The members of a cooper-
ative might collectively decide that they would prefer more free-time
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to more profit. In the long run, however, their cooperative would not
be competitive anymore. Once all factories have UneekBots, the 4h
work-day cooperative would produce at double the wage cost of ev-
ery other factory and would therefore go out of business. Product price
competition eliminates wages that are higher than average in a given
sector as “inefficiencies.” The workers would have to live off half their
wage, in order to permanently halve their workday. That, however, is
an option they already had before UneekBot. From the perspective of
a worker-owned cooperative, the situation is a “prisoner’s dilemma.”
All workers would profit if the workday were reduced, but unless a
central authority (in this case the state) forces all producers to reduce
it, none of them can reduce it individually.
Let me stress here that my claim that Utopia will not come as the
consequence of new technology does not mean it is not achievable.
The obvious (and perhaps only) means of achieving it is legal pre-
scription: a conscious choice of more time over more products, imple-
mented by force for all market participants. We could have had the
30-hour, the 25-hour the 20-hour work week et cetera a long time ago.
It is down to political decisions that we do not.
As argued, automation in a competitive market does not lead to
Dystopia either. The owner has no incentive to lay off workers until, in
Douglas Adams’ words, we reach the “shoe event horizon” (Adams,
2005, CD 3, track 10). In a competitive market, automation does not
result in either more time or fewer jobs; automation in a competitive
market results in More Shoes.
In conclusion, I answer our original question in the negative: Au-
tomation, including AI, is unlikely to permanently decrease the over-
all number of jobs or work hours. Historical precedent speaks against
this; none of the predicted declines in workhours materialized even
though the productivity increases that were supposed to enable them
did. (For some concrete examples of tasks and professions, please see
section 8.) More importantly, however, this can be axiomatically de-
duced from certain general features of a competitive market. Unless
we deliberately require market participants to disburse a productivity
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increase in the form of more time rather than more products, all will
produce more rather than take time off.
As a consequence, I reject P1 of the The UBI-After-Work Argument.
To reject P1 means to also reject P2, which is a consequence of P1. C




Let me now address some common objections to my arguments.
First, haven’t we seen an enormous decrease in work hours in a
longer historical perspective? Admittedly, there was no decrease over
the last three generations, but before WWI, the average work-day was
twelve or more hours long (Roser, 2019b, Table: Weekly work hours).
Why not think that this decrease was the result of the technological
advances we call the “industrial revolution”?
Second, ecological problems might, at some point, put a hold to
further increases in production. For Gorz, for example, ecological con-
siderations are at least as important as social considerations in jus-
tifying his progressive workload reduction scheme. If the next wave
of automation should push us to the long predicted Limits to Growth
(Meadows et al., 1972), then two scenarios are conceivable: Either hu-
manity goes beyond these limits and destroys itself with its economies
or we halt productivity by finally reducing workhours for each inven-
tion made after the sustainable productivity maximum is reached.
Third, the shoe factory example only models the reduction of work-
hours per task but not of complete professions. The workers are still
required for the task of making shoes, they just have a better tool. (In
essence, UneekBot is an upgraded sewing needle.) In the near future,
however, the work-floor will be completely taken over by machines,
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rendering all low-skilled workers superfluous. In the medium to long
term, management will suffer the same fate because they can be re-
placed by AI. There already are contemporary examples of this: “legal
tech” companies, where contracts or legal communications are writ-
ten and examined by algorithms rather than lawyers, or medical cen-
ters, where internet-based diagnoses replace doctors (Susskind and
Susskind, 2015).
To the first objection, I reply that these historical decreases in work-
hours are best explained as the result of political measures, which
in turn are the result of political struggles. The eight-hour workday,
the free Saturday, paid vacations, no child labor and reduced hours
for teenagers: All of these decreases in work hours are the result of
workers’ rights movements, workers’ parties, unions, the spreading of
democracy et cetera The eight-hour workday in the US, for example,
was largely achieved through strikes (Brooks, 1956; Whaples, 1990).
Work hours did not decline as a happy, unintended consequence of
the steam engine or the moving assembly line.
My reply to the second objection is similar. Granted that we will
reach the limits of ecologically sustainable productivity, it would be
a political decision to let productivity stagnate at that level by reduc-
ing work hours proportionally to the productivity increase generated
by any invention made afterwards. Political measures implementing
this decision would likely be the result of political struggles by envi-
ronmentalist movements, green parties, an increasingly environmen-
tally conscious public et cetera. Productivity-increasing technology it-
self does not result in productivity stagnation at a sustainable level; it
results in ecological collapse, since no individual producer in a com-
petitive market can reduce work hours unless all others do (compare
section 7).
The third objection needs to be addressed in multiple steps. The
initial step is to actually look at the facts. The endlessly repeated claim
that automation is currently reducing the overall number of low-skill
jobs is probably false. While the media regularly remind us of taxi
drivers who might soon be replaced by self-driven cars, sociologists
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point out (for example, Standing, 2018; Wajcman, 2017, pp. 124–25)
that the digital revolution has so far created a shockingly large number
of low-skill jobs—often recruited through websites with names like
“Mechanical Turk.” Consider Youtube’s digital cleaners, who live in
poor countries and spend their days deleting violent videos, or Ama-
zon’s warehouse workers, who are not even allowed to take a bath-
room break. Taxi drivers themselves are actually an example of this:
Unionized and insured professionals are today threatened by services
like Uber (Huws, 2014; Standing, 2011).
It also is false to claim that the replacement of complete professions
is a new phenomenon. By 1800, for example, 60 per cent of France’s
population worked in the agricultural sector; today it’s three per cent
(Roser, 2019a, Table: 1300 to today). The industrial revolution destroyed
professions on a massive scale, without creating permanent techno-
logical unemployment. The milker, the coachman, the weaver and the
glassblower have all vanished, but the train conductor, the electrician
and factory workers of all kinds took their place. Some economists
hence refer to this concern as the “Luddite fallacy”—after the “Lud-
dites,” 19th-century English textile craftspersons who stormed facto-
ries that had installed the then newly invented automatic loom.
Those who make the objection usually reply that this time, things
will be different. The industrial revolution is no guide to the coming,
post-digital revolution because AI will also destroy high-skill profes-
sions (Ford, 2015; Susskind and Susskind, 2015).
In and of itself, this reply is hard to evaluate because it is unclear
why the skill level should make a difference to the general point that
technological progress rarely leads to permanent technological unem-
ployment. The assumption made by Ford and the Susskinds has to be
this: AI is so versatile that it can replace workers in any profession,
even the newly evolved ones. With the spread of personal comput-
ers, for example, the profession of typist has largely vanished, but the
profession of web designer was created. In the future, however, such
a new profession would immediately be taken over by AI again. Or,
rather, no profession would ever develop because one would immedi-
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ately use a machine for the task.
Readers might not be aware of how speculative this scenario of
an AI takeover is. Among AI researchers, a consensus seems to have
evolved in recent years that AI—understood as trained, artificial neu-
ral networks—will be limited in its applications to tasks that are nar-
row and highly repetitive (Waldrop, 2019). It hence is a bold assump-
tion by the above authors that AI will be able to carry out all and any
tasks that a human worker can perform.
Even if we concede this bold assumption, the case looks dubious.
First, it moves us to an entirely different discussion because it raises
entirely new questions. One is: If our robots are so developed that they
can carry out any task a human being can, might this not require that
we assign them similar rights? Wouldn’t they, for example, have to be
paid for their work? Another question is: Wouldn’t this also be the end
of the market rather than just the end of work? As regards the latter
question, there appear to be two ways to spell out the implications of
the bold assumption:
1. In the first scenario, the material resources and the robots are pri-
vately owned. As owner of the shoe factory, you used to possess
yarn and needles and pay workers. Now you possess yarn and
robots and have laid off all workers, and the same is true for all
other factory owners. In this scenario, there would be no pay-
ing consumers anymore for the shoes that your factory produces
(apart from the few other factory owners). According to some,
this is precisely why future societies will need UBI (Duchâtelet,
2016). Mathematically, this makes no sense: If you and other fac-
tory owners are the only ones who still possess wealth, you will
have to fully finance the UBI with which your former workers
then buy your shoes. You might just as well give away your
shoes for free directly.
2. In the second scenario, the material resources and the robots are
publicly owned. In this version, everyone receives all robot prod-
ucts for free. Why, then, should we lament the vanishing of all
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occupations? This is Utopia—finally!
9 Income Allocation under Capitalism
I have already rejected the UBI-after-work argument. As a last step, I
want to discuss a presupposition that this argument makes (and that
is not necessarily shared by other arguments for UBI or by advocates
of UBI generally). This presupposition says that income in today’s
economies is merited.
The UBI-after-work argument appears radical and emancipatory.
It hence is worth pointing out that this argument does not challenge
the following two assumptions:
1. That those who own the means of production (now robots) are
entitled to all income from these.
2. That those who don’t own such means have to be unable to work
if they are still to receive income.
The argument hence accepts capitalist principles of income allocation,
as well as the underlying conception of merit. Let me expand on this
point.
In contemporary, capitalist economies, there are three main sources
of income: work, capital gains and governmental payments. In the first
case, you live off your own work. In the second and third case, you live
off the work of others.
Public attitudes toward the second and third option are very differ-
ent (Bamfield and Horton, 2009; Bartels, 2016; Guardino, 2019; Svall-
fors, 2012); a fact already lamented by Adam Smith (1976, part 1, sec-
tion 3). Most people (though not necessarily most scholars) believe
that the third option is permissible only for those with no other option,
the justification being that it would otherwise be a form of free-riding
and impossible to fund. In contrast, those who live off others’ work in
the second way are not generally publicly perceived as doing so, and
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even where they are, they tend to elicit admiration rather than con-
tempt. In the rare case that wide-spread public criticism arises, such
as after the 2008 global banking crisis (Bennett and Kottasz, 2012), it
is often not sustained enough to force significant legal changes (Ci-
hak et al., 2013; Griffith-Jones et al., 2010), even though there recently
is some evidence of a more sustained change in public attitudes (Pis-
ton, 2018). These strinkingly different attitudes toward the second and
third option seem best explained by the fact that the second income is
often seen as merited, while the third is seen as donated. The second
is based on a property right, while the third is based on the charity of
others.
Now, this system of property allocation might be justified, as would
then be the dominant public attitude toward it. My point is that the
UBI-after-work argument presupposes that it is.
P2 justifies UBI through the former workers’ need. It describes UBI
as something that the community—or perhaps their former employers—
offer in support, not as something to which these former workers have
a property right. All property rights, as C implies, still lie with the
owners of the (now automated) production facilities. Consider the
shoe factory example again: I tacitly presupposed that you, as owner,
are entitled to all of the additional gains. In the scenario More Shoes,
for example, you doubled your profit whereas the wages stayed the
same. It is not obvious that this is just: If a group of human beings
become more productive through the acquisition of a new tool, one
could think that those who work with the tool also deserve a share of
this increase, not just the person who bought the tool—as a long line of
intellectuals from Hobson (1931) to Brecht (1988) has pointed out. One
could furthermore think that there is something wrong with a com-
munity in which some members can monopolize the tools. The UBI-
after-work argument, however, presupposes that this arrangement is
just, or at least leaves it uninterrogated. In the scenario it forecasts,
the highly automated production facilities have the same owners as
before. The newly unemployed live off transfer payments justified
through their needs, just as today’s welfare payments are. Admittedly,
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means tests have been abolished—otherwise the measure would not
qualify as UBI—, but this is not because we have changed our ideas
on who merits what. The tests simply became superfluous because in
a highly automated economy with private and highly concentrated
ownership in means of production almost everyone is in need. The ar-
gument suggests an egalitarian scenario, where all members of society
profit from technological progress. In order to translate the additional
capital gains into public wealth, however, the same constraints and
strategies as always apply: We would have either to tax or mutualize
these facilities. How highly automated a facility is makes no difference
here.
I have not argued against the presuppositions of the UBI-after-
work argument. These might not be problematic, and then what I
point out in this section might be no reason to reject the argument. It
is important to see, however, that the UBI-after-work argument does
not demand that we switch to a new economic system. It fully sub-
scribes to the capitalist conception of merit and does not question its
principles of income allocation.
10 Conclusion
I conclude that the Utopian and the Dystopian predictions regarding
automation and basic income are equally wrong. Widespread techno-
logical unemployment will not come to pass, and even if it did and UBI
were introduced to ameliorate these effects, our conceptions of merit
and our principles of income allocation would not be challenged by
this measure because the payments are made to people based on their
inability to work, just as today’s welfare payments are. Political deci-
sions, not technological progress in production, leads to more leisure
and a more egalitarian distribution of incomes. If these are our aims,
then other political reactions to technological progress are probably
preferable to UBI. This result does not entail that UBI might not be
worth introducing for other reasons, only that technological progress
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is no reason to introduce UBI.
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